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Introduction
GENE R. SHREW
Our subject-variously termed choice of law, conflict of laws, or conflicts law-is
the body of legal doctrine that seeks to provide a basis for choosing a substantive rule
(e.g., in tort or contract) over the conflicting rule of another place. Rules conflict
when their applications would produce opposing results in the same case, and when
the relation of each place to the controversy makes it plausible for the rule of either
place to govern. Conflicts law is usually state common law, applied either by state
courts or by federal courts in exercise of the latter's diversity jurisdiction.
Choice of law has for more than half a century pursued multiple, perhaps
competing objectives in theory. It has often appeared uncertain in application. This
has prompted extensive debate over what conflicts law is or should be. Should it be
multilateral in character (a body of rules to be administered throughout a community
of jurisdictions)? Or unilateral (keyed to the reach or purpose of laws vying for
acceptance)? When or how should conflicts law promote particular substantive results
(e.g., pro-recovery law in product liability cases)? When should it defir to
expectations of the parties? How many of these or other policies can be consolidated
in a single choice-of-law approach (conflicts eclecticism)?
Our Symposium contributors examine many of the contemporary problems
associated with choice of law and, specifically, consider whether or how a third
restatement of conflicts of law might improve the quality of conflicts law. Many
questions arise. Is it right to assume (as a new restatement probably would) that
conflicts law in the United States will remain largely state common law? If so, is a
new conflicts restatement desirable to overcome shortcomings in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict ofLaws ("Second Restatement)? For example, should a new
conflicts restatement exhibit a clearer preference between rules and method in choice
of law? A clearer preference among contending conflicts values (for example,
multilateralism, unilateralism, substantivism, party expectations)? Should a new
conflicts restatement take greater account of choice of law by statute or treaty? Of
recent developments here and abroad in choice of law, adjudicatory jurisdiction, and
the enforcement ofjudgments?
The American Law Institute ("ALr, or "Institute") took a strongly multilateralist
position in its original Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws in 1934, and
replaced it with an eclectic approach in the SecondRestatement in 1971. The Second
Restatement has attracted many judges (if fewer commentators), but it has not
prevented the subject of choice of law from reaching what many believe is a state of
crisis. The restatements of the ALI are entering their third generation, yet the ALI has
not initiated work on a third restatement of conflicts.
Conflicts continues to be perhaps the most confused, controversial, and unpopular
branch of American law. Yet I doubt that the absence to date of a new conflicts
initiative is because the ALI would find the project too daunting. The mandate of the
Institute is after all "to improve law and its administration."' The features of conflicts
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law that make the subject especially problematic should if anything increase the
likelihood of a third restatement project by the Institute before too long.
Yet the following argument can be made against taking the possibility of a third
conflicts restatement seriously. The depths of dissatisfaction with conflicts law are
sobering.' They are also longstanding? Perhaps then a third conflicts restatement is
a mistake simply because it supports the idea that it is desirable to have conflicts law.
The argument could take a couple of forms. First, can we not focus our energies
instead on making substantive law uniform-eliminating conflicts, hence the need for
conflicts law? Second, even in the absence of substantive law uniformity, can we not
simply refuse to take conflicts law seriously, somehow willing it out of existence?'
Neither of these options is realistic. Concerning the first, opportunities abound
within our federal structure ofgovernment for each state within the Union to exercise
an independence in substantive law making. This is due to the frequent absence of
national law, and due to the lack of any requirement that sister states agree. Uniform
substantive law therefore is unlikely ever to appear on a scale rendering American
conflicts law obsolete.' Concerning the second option, discussions appearing
throughout this Symposium demonstrate the reality of conflicts problems and the
continuing need for conflicts law.
That is not to say that our Symposium participants necessarily agree on the
desirability or shape of a third conflicts restatement. Some contributors reject a
restatement approach for conflicts,6 or question whether the time is right for a new
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conflicts restatement.' Others more receptive to the prospect of a third restatement
differ over what they would like to see: rules as opposed to method," method as
opposed to rules,9 governmental interest analysis,'" avoidance of governmental
interest analysis," substantivism, 2 or avoidance of substantivism. 3 Contributors
variously urge that our conception of a new conflicts restatement must be informed
by more extensive empirical research,' 4 a better understanding of international legal
developments, experience gained from the preparation of the earlier conflicts
restatements 16 or from the preparation of recent restatements in other fields, 7 and a
broad appreciation of opportunities to reform American conflicts law possible from

a new restatement.
This is one ofthe richest and most important collections of writings ever assembled
on a conflicts topic. I am deeply grateful to our scholars for contributions and to the
editors of the Indiana Law Journal for their tireless efforts to bring this Issue
together. I hope that readers find in this Symposium both enlightenment and a sense
of direction for the future.

7. See Gary J. Simson, Leave Bad Enough Alone, 75 IND. L.J. 649 (2000); Russell J.
Weintraub, The Restatement Third ofConflict of Laws: An Idea Whose Time HasNot Come,
75 IND. L.J. 679 (2000).

8. See Alfred Hill, Fora Third Conflicts Restatement-But Stop Trying To Reinvent the
Wheel, 75 IND. L.J. 535 (2000).

9. See Robert A. Sedler, Choice ofLaw in Conflicts Torts Cases:A Third Restatement or
Rules of Choice ofLaw?, 75 IND. L.J. 615 (2000).

10. See, e.g., Bruce Posnak, The Restatement (Second): Some Not So Fine Tuning for a
Restatement (Third): A Very Well-CurriedLeflar over Reese with Korn on the Side (OrIs It
Cob?), 75 IND. L.J. 561 (2000); William A. Reppy, Jr., Codifying InterestAnalysisin the Torts
Chapterof a New Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L.J. 591 (2000).
11. See Hill, supranote 8.
12. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Pay No Attention to That Man Behindthe Curtain:
The PlaceofBetterLaw in a Third Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 659 (2000).
13. See Perry Dane, Whereof One Cannot Speak- Legal Diversity and the Limits of
Restatement, 75 IND. L.J. 511 (2000).
14. See Patrick J. Borchers, Empiricism and Theory in Conflicts Law, 75 IND. L.J. 509
(2000); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prologomenon to an Empirical
Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L.J. 417 (2000). But see Courtland H. Peterson, Restating
Conflicts Again: A Curefor Schizophrenia?,75 IND. L.J. 549 (2000) (questioning the possible
contributions of empiricism).
15. See Mathias Reimann,A NewRestatement-Forthe InternationalAge,75 IND. L.J. 575
(2000); Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challengefor the AL!:
Herein ofForeign CountryJudgments, an InternationalTreaty, andan American Statute, 75
IND. L.J. 635 (2000).

16. See Harold G.Maier, The UtilitarianRole ofa Restatement ofConflicts in a Common
Law System: How Much JudicialDeference is Due to the Restaters or "Who are these guys,
anyway? ", 75 IND. L.J. 541 (2000).
17. See Aaron D. Twerski, One Size Does Not FitAll: The Third Multi-TrackRestatement
of Conflicts ofLaws, 75 IND. L.J. 667 (2000).

18. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a
ProposalforTort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437 (2000); Louise Weinberg, A StructuralRevision
of the Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L.J. 475 (2000).

